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INTRODUCTION: THE EMBODIED AND THE VIRTUAL
Herbert Simon, the great information theorist, stated in his“Travel Theorem” that “anything that can be learned by anormal American adult on a trip to a foreign country … can
be learned more quickly, cheaply, and easily by visiting the San Diego
Public Library.” Elaborating on this, he claimed that it
is well known that one can circumnavigate the globe, penetrating
deserts and jungles along the way, without ever venturing outside
one’s own Western, industrialized, air-conditioned culture, or
learning that there is anything different from it. I have had a
thrilling view of Ulan Bator and the Gobi Desert from 30,000
feet, in the business-class comfort of a B747.
Travelling to Europe with his wife in 1965, he visited many of the
places depicted in Cezanne’s paintings. However, they “learned nothing
new; we had already seen the paintings.”1
After a few years working as a chemical engineer in the petroleum industry, David
Kidner moved into the social sciences with a Ph.D. in experimental personality research
at London University. For the past three decades he has taught psychology, sociology,
and environmental philosophy in England and the USA, and is currently at Nottingham
Trent University. He is the author of Nature and Psyche: Radical Environmentalism and
the Politics of Subjectivity (SUNY Press, 2001).
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Edward Abbey provides an example of a fundamentally different
kind of American pioneer. Lambasting those who would see the world
only from behind a window, he argued that
     … you can’t see anything from a car; you’ve got to get out of
the goddamned contraption and walk, better yet crawl, on hands
and knees, over the sandstone and through the thornbush and
cactus. When traces of blood begin to mark your trail you’ll see
something, maybe.2
These two accounts encapsulate a powerful, covert tension between
an embodied, sensual perspective that is becoming an endangered
species in the industrial world and a perspective based on cognition,
language, and visual representation—almost a virtual world—that is
in the ascendancy. In historical terms, the divergence between these
perspectives reflects the underlying polarization between idealism and
materialism which has plagued philosophy since Plato and Aristotle;
and only rarely have social philosophers tried to understand us both
as embodied creatures who participate in natural processes and as
cultural beings who inhabit a symbolic realm. The same virulent trend
can also be seen in our everyday lives, and is reflected in the increasing
commodification of forms of individual subjectivity—often
electronically amplified and manipulated by advertising—that are
unanchored to external reality. The ethnobotanist Gary Nabhan has
found that even indigenous children on the American continent “had
seen more animals on television and in the movies than they had
personally seen in the wild,” and that direct knowledge of the natural
world is rapidly being lost even among native groups such as the
O’odham.3 In this paper, I will argue that analytical psychology is,
among other things, an attempt to address this tension, albeit one
that is to some extent frustrated by the epistemological conditions of
its birth. In particular, I will argue that analytical psychology and
ecology are not two mutually incomprehensible realms, and that there
are fruitful parallels and complementarities between them.
Jung, an enthusiastic traveller himself, was well aware of European
philosophy’s idealist slant. For example, in his discussion of the Mother
archetype, he points out that with the Catholic doctrine of the
assumption of the Virgin Mary, “the Mother of God was divested of
all the essential qualities of materiality, [and] matter became completely
de-souled.”4 Nevertheless, he was not immune to the same polarization
of matter and spirit, and inconsistencies in his work are often
symptomatic of a struggle between a view of the psyche which is rooted
in a realm of pure human meaning and one in which meaning arises
out of our embodiment and, ultimately, out of the earth. As Roger
Brooke has noted, Jung’s vacillation may have been partly due to the
incompatibility between his insights and the available forms of
language; and as a result his “intuitive understanding of psychological
life far surpassed most of his theoretical formulations.”5 His view that
there was a continuity between psyche and the biological world was
one of his central “intuitive understandings,” albeit one which is difficult
to express given the reductionist and individualist connotations of the
term “biology.” Consequently, when Jung describes archetypes as
“patterns of instinctual behaviour,”6 he is not reverting to the reductive
biologism of his day which viewed behavior as due to an array of internal
“drives,” expressed within a passive, featureless world. “Instinct,” for
Jung, is a far more flexible, intelligent, and structured entity than it is,
say, for Freud.
Jung never entirely escaped the Cartesian emphasis on thought as
the source of structure, however, and both his references to
“withdrawing projections” from the world and his return to Europe
following his visit to Mount Elgon can be viewed as strategic retreats
back into the safety of prevailing assumptions.7 But why were the
Kenyan plains so captivating to Jung; and equally, why were they so
threatening? I will argue that the absence of a dynamic conception of
the world was the insuperable obstacle which made Jung’s movement
towards an embodied conception of psyche a dangerous one.
VANISHING RESONANCE
Is our only choice between a self defined through its safely dualistic
separation from the world, on the one hand, and one in which we
become so merged with the world within a larger psychic field that we
lose all autonomy? Of course, both these types of experience are
commonplace: we have all “withdrawn into ourselves” from time to
time, and we have all “lost ourselves” in some larger field such as music,
spiritual experience, or a natural landscape. But these experiences are
not irreversible epistemological decisions which determine our character
thereafter, but part of the ebb-and-flow of subjective experience, the
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spontaneous variation in resonance with whatever is outside ourselves.
Like the homecoming traveller, we can return to our “individual”
psychological boundaries, giving us the confidence to momentarily
extend ourselves into the world as we empathize with another, whether
human or non-human, or “lose ourselves” in a magnificent natural
setting, or give ourselves to some cause; and it is this dynamic capacity
of subjectivity to reach out into the world which is denied by most
psychology. It is a capacity which is particularly endangered in a society
which has become narcissistic through the cultivation of the individual,
the loss of integrative cultural structures, and the shrivelling of our
belief in a world which transcends our own lifetimes, individual powers,
and spiritual capabilities.
Just as the self becomes ossified into the “individual” through this
stilling of resonant relations with the outside world, something very
similar happens to the world itself through our identification of
“separate” items which are, in Alfred North Whitehead’s terms, “fully
describable apart from any reference to any other portion of matter.”
In the same way that the freezing of experiential spontaneity results
from our definition as individuals, dynamism and structural spontaneity
are drained from the world by its reduction to ecological fragments
having only mechanical relations to each other. Whitehead goes on to
note that this freezing of dynamism also applies to time: a stone, he
remarks, is generally described “without any reference to past or
future.”8 Tim Ingold’s summary of the effects of such mappings of the
world captures this well:
… all is still and silent. There is neither sunlight nor moonlight;
there are no variations of light or shade; no clouds, no shadows
or reflections. The wind does not blow, neither disturbing the
trees nor whipping the water into waves. No birds fly in the sky,
or sing in the woods; forests and pastures are devoid of animal
life; houses and streets are empty of people and traffic. To dismiss
all this … is perverse, to say the least. For it is no less than the
stuff of life itself … .9
For present purposes, the main consequence of this dual freezing
of self and world is that both can be “pinned down” and defined
without reference to the other, fitting neatly into the industrialist
conception of masterful, autonomous individuals acting within a world
that is passive and devoid of spirit. Jung struggled against this
conception; but his theory has nevertheless been portrayed in ways
that he would be uneasy with. In various undergraduate texts, for
example, I have seen the Jungian model of the personality portrayed
in diagrammatic terms with consciousness at the top, “above” the
personal unconscious, which is itself “above” a collective unconscious
which spreads out into the earth. And of course such representations
are not without a certain truth-value. However, what we gain in clarity
and constancy through representing the psyche in such “geological”
terms has to be balanced against the veiling of a sort of dynamic
interpenetration which is as much a part of the world as any static
structure.
Such resonant extensions of self are precisely what are lost in
assumptions of “scientific objectivity” and in our everyday, common-
sense experience of the urban, largely manufactured, “environments”
we inhabit. This is a sort of vicious circle: in defining the self
individualistically, we exclude the resonances that bring the world to
life; and in constructing an environment with which resonance is
difficult, we bring into being a psychically dead world. As a result,
any other psychic organization than that of the contemporary
narcissistic individual is extinguished, its possibility reawakened only
by historical or anthropological accounts of ecstatic self-transcendence.
So it is that we lose those properties of the world that have been seen
as spiritual or even beautiful—or, in more prosaic ecosystemic terms,
as emergent. For example, Nabhan recognizes that ecological relations
are not just ecological, as the term is commonly used, but also imply
something more ineffable. In pointing to the relation between the
dwindling numbers of a desert flower, Kearney’s Blue Star, in southern
Arizona and the plummeting population of the species of bee that
pollinates them, he remarks that “it was as if the Blue Stars’ bodies
were there, but their spirits had flown away.”10 One wonders whether
something similar could be said about us: if, as Roger Brooke argues,
we become spiritual beings not through the discovery of some capacity
within ourselves, but through “the world’s revelation as a temple,”11
then the fragmentation and destruction of the natural world becomes
a spiritual loss and, indeed, the loss of an essential dimension of
humanity.
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REPRESENTING THE RESONANT SELF
Despite his cultural background, Jung clearly saw that psychic
organization taps into the past and into the world itself, and he
struggled throughout his life to represent this embeddedness. As he
put it,
the archetypes are as it were hidden foundations of the conscious
mind, or, to use another comparison, the roots which the psyche
has sunk not only in the earth in the narrower sense but in the
world in general. …[archetypes are that portion of the psyche]
through which the psyche is attached to nature.12
But as he recognized, this metaphor of rootedness fails adequately to
represent the dynamism of our relation to the rest of nature, as does his
alternative image of a building with multiple floors, including a cellar
and beneath the cellar “a choked-up cave with neolithic tools in the
upper layer and remnants of fauna from the same period in the lower
layers.”13 Pointing to the limitations of this metaphor, Jung argues
that “[e]verything is alive, and our upper story, consciousness, is
continually influenced by its living and active foundations.”14 Two
decades later, he would suggest that “[i]ndividual consciousness is
only the flower and the fruit of a season, sprung from the perennial
rhizome beneath the earth.”15 Other remarks of his make it clear that
he is striving toward a biology that is ahead of its time—one that is
intelligent, self-organizing, and imbued with potentialities that
transcend their present particular manifestations and the historically
contingent splits between what is embodied and what is psychic. As
Jung puts it, in “the world of the archetypes [we are] still a part of
nature.”16
In trying to express the dynamic spontaneous variations and
fleeting mutual engagements of self and world, Jung converted temporal
differences—in which the resonance of self with world varies from
moment to moment—into structural differences between the conscious,
egoic aspects of self and those which are collective and unconscious. If,
during the course of our day, we are at times self-sufficient, self-
absorbed, and inward looking, at other times empathic, engrossed in
something outside ourselves, temporarily “forgetting ourselves,” then
we are both individual and transcendent of our individuality. These
individual and self-transcendent moments are not easy to represent
within a single model, and portraying the latter as “more deeply buried”
inadequately conveys their momentary impact on some present situation.
In other words, while the collective aspects of self are often represented
as “older” or “deeper,” they may also be expressed in terms of a
fundamental resonance with the natural world, albeit one which is
diminished today for reasons I have tried to express above. This
“resonant” model better represents our collective aspects’ continual
influence on present functioning and avoids the implication that
resonance with the natural world is somehow an outdated aspect of
psychic functioning rather than an ever-present potentiality that is
frustrated by the current political context.
THE ORDER OF NATURE
“The symbols of the self arise in the depths of the body and they
express its materiality every bit as much as the structure of the perceiving
consciousness,” says Jung.17 The “depths” Jung refers to are those of
“chemical substances,” since in his day there was little awareness of
ecosystems or of the self-organizing tendencies of inorganic matter. It
is surely likely that if Jung had had access to the ecological and
biological knowledge we have today, he would have seen a relation
between ecosystemic and psychological patterns.
As we have seen, Jung chose an image from the natural world—
that of the rhizome—to illustrate certain properties of the psyche,
since “both” realms embody temporal relations that are not simply
linear and cannot be understood according to straightforward cause-
effect paradigms, but rather contain circular and even more complex
forms of relation.18 According to this image, the past remains an active
influence on the present, rather than simply “what happened before”
and is now left behind. For example, ecological restorationists have
found that simply reconstituting a system by bringing together the
species that were originally present can result in any one of a variety of
communities,19 and that
 the order in which species attempt colonization tremendously
influences final community composition and richness … It is
not possible to reassemble a particular community composition
using only the species present in the final steady-state
community.20
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Furthermore, some ecosystems may be impossible to reproduce, since
certain extinct (“ghost”) species, while not part of the final, desired
system, are vital to the evolution of the desired succession.21 The history
of an ecosystem, then, is an essential ingredient in its current
functioning, as is the case with psychological functioning.
These dynamics are echoed in the cultures of many tribal peoples
for whom the ancestors are living influences and presences rather than
being cognitively relegated to the “past.” In recognizing this, Ingold,
like Jung, uses the image of the rhizome to convey relationships between
thought and nature in terms of a “dense and tangled cluster of
interlaced threads or filaments, any point in which can be connected
to any other”22 — a model that aims to “return [thinking] to the
contexts of lived experience.”23
There is thus a commonality between the analytical psychologist’s
awareness that the past is still a living influence on the present and the
ecologist’s recognition that the present state of an ecosystem depends
on and embodies its history—that is, the order and pattern of its
development, as well as its present constituents, affect its dynamics.24
Clearly, human life is embedded in recursive natural patterns such as
the orbit of the earth round the sun, the lunar phases, and so on; but
there are more complex patterns than this in nature, such as the
sometimes chaotic relations between predator and prey, most famously
that of the Canadian lynx/snowshoe hare system.25 The main
characteristic of these chaotic systems is that they move between states
in a deterministic and somewhat regular way, but never exactly
reproduce the same conditions; and since tiny differences in initial
conditions can result in major divergences a few cycles down the line,
they are inherently unpredictable and cognitively opaque. Even
apparently simple natural systems—such as the way a leaf floats to the
ground, the behavior of eddies by a riverbank, or variations in a species’
population can be dynamically and enormously complex. There are
even more rudimentary astronomical systems, exemplified by the “three
body problem,” which involves the behavior of three gravitationally-
attracted bodies of roughly equivalent mass, which are also
extraordinarily difficult to predict. Such cases alert us to the existence
of patterns in the natural world which appear simple enough, but
which cognition finds difficult to recognize or understand. As Jung
argued, we refer to such things as “complicated, when in reality they
are very simple and know nothing of our intellectual problems.”26
After all, the three bodies—supposedly made of “extended matter”
and cognitively incapable, show no hesitation in deciding where to
position themselves!
The lesson here—a very basic one which is usually evaded, since it
directly challenges pivotal assumptions of industrial society—is that
nature, like psyche, contains types of order and intelligence which are
cognitively unmanageable, and that the varieties of order we are capable
of conceptualizing are therefore a subset of natural orders. This lesson
has been obscured by the view, particularly prevalent since Kant and
now given added impetus by postmodernism, that cognition does not
discover or recognize order in the world, but instead imposes its own
order on the world—a view unfortunately echoed in Jung’s statement
that “it is my mind, with its store of images, that gives the world
colour and sound.”27 In this way, the mind’s incapacity to register the
wholeness of nature is taken not as an indication of the limitations of
cognition, but as an excuse to portray the world as structureless, as a
blank screen onto which we project our mind-ful ideas and explanations
and impose our industrialist structures. This in turn distances the
(supposedly active) mind from the (supposedly passive) world.
While there is a certain amount of ironic truth in such a view,
given our ongoing destruction of natural order and the emergence of a
grossly simplified and artificial environment out of the resulting debris,
this process needs to be understood in the historical context of our
growing alienation from the natural order. We cannot take the
industrially constructed world, including agriculture, simply as
“reality,” even—or particularly—if there is a close match between it
and cognitive “rationality.” Rather, what passes for “reality” in the
contemporary world should be viewed as a special and reduced actuality
compared to the diversity and multiple potentialities which are present
in nature and which we can still sometimes sense through our
embodied being; and equally, the “normal individual” should be viewed
as a potentially whole person shorn of those resonant faculties that
could bring both us and the world to life.
EMBODIED ECOLOGIES
Although cognition finds it difficult to recognize and respond to
the complexities of nature, our bodies are often better equipped in
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this respect. Such taken-for-granted activities as walking, throwing a
tennis ball, breathing, or maintaining a constant bodily temperature
would overwhelm our cognitive faculties if they had to carry out all
the necessary calculations. Non-human organisms, although lacking
our cognitive equipment, are in many ways equally proficient. A tree
“knows” how best to distribute its roots in order to ensure stability;
and a prairie flower “knows” what colors will attract pollinators. These
ecologically embedded forms of natural intelligence are usually ignored
because of cognition’s preoccupation with its own particular, abstract
varieties of order.
Not all societies regard intelligence as necessarily disembodied. In
a study of three Guatemalan forest dwelling groups, for example, Scott
Atran found that although the Itzaj of the Petén Maya lowlands are
better conservationists than other groups, they have little in the way
of social organization that would encourage conservation, and seem
rather individualistic. But a more intimate understanding of the Itzaj
reveals that they embody an “emergent knowledge structure.” As Atran
explains,
an emergent knowledge structure is not a set body of knowledge
or tradition that is taught or learned as shared content. … The
general idea is that one’s cultural upbringing primes one to pay
attention to certain observable relationships … [For Itzaj,] there
is no ‘principle of reciprocity’ applied to forest entities, no ‘rules
for appropriate conduct’ in the forest, and no ‘controlled
experimental determinations’ of the fitness of ecological
relationships. Yet reciprocity is all pervasive and fitness enduring.28
In other words, the Itzaj do not rely on conscious, rational
algorithms in determining their behavior towards the forest. Rather,
they exemplify Tim Ingold’s view that among such indigenous peoples
it is as entire persons, not as disembodied minds, that human
beings engage with one another and, moreover, with non-human
beings as well. They do so as beings in a world, not as minds
which, excluded from a given reality, find themselves … having
to make sense of it.29
Such peoples illustrate Jung’s view that “‘at bottom,’ psyche is
simply ‘world.’”30 For example, sila is the root form of various Inuit
words implying “intelligence;” and significantly, these words refer both
to individual intelligence and intelligence that is “out there in the
world.”31 Similarly, the language of the White Mountain Apache
contains the root word ni,’ which refers to both mind and land.32
What such linguistic forms suggest is that for many indigenous groups,
mind is in the world or—better—mind is the world; and that the
landscape is also a mindscape. It is becoming increasingly difficult to
dismiss such ecologically embedded epistemologies as involving
“projection:” there is a wealth of anthropological material to counter
such interpretations; and, in any case, in an environment such as the
northern Greenland Arctic, mis-characterizing the natural environment
is likely to result in an immediate and dire reduction in one’s life
expectancy.
The fact that such indigenous groups often have the utmost
difficulty expressing their world-relatedness through language is only
a problem for those who place the structures of language above those
of the world and who are unsympathetic to Jung’s recognition that “a
great many archetypal images and associations are … absolutely
incommunicable through language.”33 The questionable assumption
we often make is that in order to “solve” a “problem,” we first have to
recode it into a form that can be consciously understood and
communicated—a conceptual tyranny that has hampered the
development of a grounded understanding of our relations with the
earth. Conscious rationality is indeed a highly effective tool for certain
purposes; but it is not effective for everything, and in particular it is
not effective for grappling with environmental problems which, by
their very nature, reflect the systemic types of interaction which
consciousness finds difficult to recognize.
In industrial society, the polarization between a mentalistic realm
and a physical realm of mere “matter” carries with it a tendency for
entities to be ascribed to one or other of these realms. Some entities,
however, are particularly difficult to fit into this dualistic scheme; and
the “ecosystem” is one such entity. Some would claim that ecosystems
have no existence outside thought, and that they are conceptual
conveniences that bear no discernable relation to any physically-existing
reality.34 Others would claim that in talking about ecosystems, we are
referring to objectively recognizable systems of trophic exchanges and
physical interactions.35 Like archetypes, ecosystems therefore belong
to that class of epistemologically subversive entities which resist being
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viewed either as products of the human intellect or as pre-existing
features of the world. In a society which seems to be rapidly abandoning
the natural realm in favor of a manufactured world that is the product
of human intelligence, the unsurprising notion that the fundamentals
of our psychological and physiological functioning are rooted in the
natural order is not a welcome one. To a greater extent than most
societies, we rely on abstract systems of understanding which are only
distantly related—if at all—to ecological and phenomenological
realities and which are imposed on the world. This is in stark contrast
to the many culturally and geographically diverse systems of
understanding which are based on phenomenal experience of the world.36
For those us who inhabit a largely domesticated environment, the
notion that the world is an amorphous cornucopia of “natural resources”
is not obviously erroneous; but among peoples whose lives are more
closely integrated with natural rhythms and processes, such a notion
would seem baffling and unintelligent.
For example, the spawning behavior of fish in the Palau area of
Micronesia is intricately related to the phases of the moon, and an
understanding of the lunar calendar therefore becomes essential for
survival in this fish-dependent society.37 If the Palauans instead used
the Western calendar, the behavior of fish would appear to vary
unpredictably from year to year, and fishing would become more of a
hit-or-miss affair. In assuming that nature has no structure, we cover
up its structure beneath our imposed conceptual patterns, thereby
furthering our alienation and blurring our awareness of natural patterns.
While the fishermen of Palau, like the fish they catch, are embedded
within natural processes, we often distance ourselves from these
processes, from the other creatures that embody and express them,
and from our own archetypal wisdom. Human behavior, we believe, is
the outcome of cognitive calculation, and so is not comparable with
“animal” behavior, which is supposedly lacking in rationality and more
mechanistically determined. For example, Tim Ingold points out that
while human tracking behavior tends to be viewed in terms of  “cognitive
strategies,” almost identical tracking behavior among non-human
species is seen as reflecting the mindless operation of “instinct.”38 As
Jung noted, what we denigrate as “instinctual” may reflect patterns
that are “common to man and animals alike.”39
Mathematics, too, is frequently understood as a purely human
pursuit; and yet it is often embodied in the behavior of other creatures.
For example, cicadas emerge at intervals governed by prime numbers,
thus minimizing the opportunities for attack by predators.40 The
arrangement of leaves and petals on plants, the shapes of shells, often
reflect the Fibonacci series, in which each term is the sum of the previous
two terms. As Darwin showed, even the humble earthworm behaves
in an intelligent way that is not reducible to instinct.41 And the hunting
capacities of the kingfisher or the hawk, and the navigational skills of
the crane are highly sophisticated. Because these abilities are embodied
rather than abstract, however, they tend to be excluded from our
conception of “intelligence,” thus fortifying our supposedly unique
position in the animal kingdom at the price of denying part of our
own identity and nature.
THE DISEMBODIED SOCIETY
Although the notion that physical being contains its own
intelligence and order has often been dismissed as “mysticism,” there
is now a good deal of evidence to support this hypothesis, beginning
with Stanley Miller’s pioneering experiment demonstrating that under
certain conditions resembling the early earth’s atmosphere, basic
components of living things such as amino acids spontaneously form
from simple inorganic chemicals.42 These and other results have been
developed by biologists such as Stuart Kauffman to demonstrate that
life is not due to some external (deistic or other) force imposing order
on “extended matter,” but rather that it stems from self-organizing
qualities that are inherent in matter itself.43 Such findings undermine
the Cartesian attempt, which tacitly permeates much theorizing in
the human sciences to abstract a realm of intelligence or spirit from
the rest of the world, including the human body.
If we are to advance beyond such dualistic splits, we need to reject
the idealist notion that cognition imposes order on an otherwise
amorphous world and to recognize, with Jung, that our embodied
senses have evolved to recognize order that is already present in the
world. Currently, the dominant view is that of Herbert Simon: learning
necessarily comes from human symbolic representations, and direct
experience of the world is merely a distraction. Such assumptions are
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often embodied in curriculum design and even in the physical
infrastructure of learning: for example, in the academic institution
where I teach, all the lecture theaters constructed in the past 20 years
have been windowless and artificially lit so that no natural sound,
sight, or smell is allowed to mingle with the information presented in
lectures. The implied assumption is that learning involves shutting
out the world rather than gaining access to it and that, as a recent
postmodernist paper puts it, “language constitutes the human world
and the human world constitutes the whole world.”44
Not all Westerners, of course, commit this error. For example, Ted
Strehlow, the important but largely ignored ethnographer of Australian
aboriginal life, moved during the course of his career from a critical
condescension toward the absence of rapid cultural “development”
among Australian natives towards a dawning realization that the natural
world was their cultural context, and that there was no reason for it to
“develop.”45 This view sits so uncomfortably with contemporary
assumptions about our necessary “progress” toward a “post natural”
society that Strehlow’s work has been largely buried since the 1930’s.
If, contrary to current academic convention, one finds meaning already
present in the world so that culture is grounded in this meaning, then
there is no particular need to develop independent realms of symbolism.
For example, Morris Berman, discussing anthropologists’ earnest
attempts to find cultural meaning in the annual migration of the
Basseri, dares voice a heretical possibility: “what if the meaning of the
migration were … the migration?”46 All too often, the development of
a complex symbolic realm is a first step towards the re-constitution of
the world to accord with this realm, so that we forget the original
world that the symbolism was supposed to be symbolic of.
As a child, I was puzzled why adults I knew were so captivated by
paintings of landscapes or bowls of fruit. All I had to do was to look
out of the window at the clouds or trees to see something incomparably
more intricate and beautiful. Many indigenous peoples, too, value the
natural over human representations, seeing the latter as expendable
and temporary pointers to a more exalted realm. Karl Scheibe provides
some examples:
Alaskan Eskimo mask makers, … having created a mask out of
some inner impulse, use it once and then burn it. Similarly,
Japanese and Tibetan Buddhists create paintings and images
that are not to be seen, and Navaho sand paintings are to be
destroyed almost as soon as they are finished.47
In contrast, our fetishization of manufactured things confines us
within a narcissistic world of our own desires which, far from extending
us into other realms of spirit and intelligence, dissipates psyche by
consuming the natural world which is its, and our, home.
CONCLUSION
I am not suggesting that we can simply equate the archetypal and
physiological dimensions of reality, or that we should rush into
simplistic analogies or crude equivalencies. Roger Brooke rightly
cautions us that although there
 are indeed loose analogies between certain archetypal experiences
and physiological responses … to situate one within the other is
to confuse two radically different areas of discourse.48
Nevertheless, the radical difference to which Brooke refers is indeed a
discursive one which does not reflect any corresponding divide in the
natural world. “Psyche and body … are one and the same,” says Jung;49
in which case discourse should strive to express this continuity. A key
difference between the study of life at the molecular and cellular levels,
on the one hand, and the study of archetypes, on the other, has
traditionally been in the reductionist slant of the former and the
systemic complexity of the latter, merging into the realms of culture
and mythology. These divergent methodologies seemed justified so
long as the biological sciences could not articulate the organizational
intricacies of life; but given the contemporary awareness of natural
complexity and ecological interactions, these divergences are much
less justifiable today. Edward O. Wilson argues that our long experience
of other creatures such as snakes inevitably led to their incorporation
within culture:
How could it be otherwise? The brain evolved into its present
form over a period of about two million years … during which
people existed in hunter-gatherer bands in intimate contact with
the natural environment. Snakes mattered. The smell of water,
the hum of a bee, the directional bend of a plant stalk mattered.
The naturalist’s trance was adaptive: the glimpse of one small
animal hidden in the grass could make the difference between
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eating and going hungry in the evening. And a sweet sense of
horror, the shivery fascination with monsters and creeping forms
that so delight us today even in the sterile hearts of the cities,
could see you through to the next morning. Organisms are the
natural stuff of metaphor and ritual … We stay alert and alive in
the vanished forests of the world.50
Is it surprising, then, that our sense of otherness, even within
ourselves, resonates with our long experience of other natural beings?
Or that the “anima also has affinities with animals, which symbolize
her characteristics?”51 Or that our own mothers carry “for us that inborn
image of the mater natura and mater spiritualis, of the totality of life of
which we are a small and helpless part?”52 If, in “the world of the
archetypes, [man] is still a part of Nature and is connected with his
own roots,”53 how can we justify the absence of a discourse which
articulates rather than obscures the unity of psyche and nature?
Of course, any single discourse or methodology will be unable to
capture the entirety of any natural structure; and so it is quite justifiable
that different discourses are used to describe the psychic and ecological
aspects of nature. The danger, however, is that the idealist and the
materialist, in developing their own paradigms and languages,
gradually lose touch with and suppress what they unknowingly share
—the unity of life—leading to the mistaken belief that these discursive
differences reflect differences in reality. To avoid this pitfall, we also
need to develop a connective language which articulates not the
distinctions suggested by the terms psyche and nature, but the often
unrecognized common realm to which they both refer.
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